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Housing markets in most countries feature strong government involvement.
This involvement typically takes the form of direct subsidies (e.g., housing
allowances, public housing), tax incentives (e.g., mortgage interest deduction),
and market regulations (e.g., tenure protection legislation), among other policy
instruments. There are several objectives for this activist role of the govern-
ment. First, it is claimed that housing markets are inefficient and need counter-
balancing government actions to achieve pareto efficiency. A second motive is
the belief that everybody merits reasonable housing and that society ought to
provide this housing if an individual cannot afford it. Third, supporting hous-
ing consumption and investment serves as a convenient mechanism to re-
distribute income and wealth.
Many pages have been filled with discussions of these motives.
1 I do not
want to repeat the merits and pitfalls of these arguments in this paper. Rather
I want to concentrate on those programs that are intended to ensure social pro-
tection and analyze whether they achieve this goal and whether they have side
effects on the performance of the housing market. In particular, I want to deter-
mine whether the social protection comes at the expense of economic flexibil-
ity hindering equilibrating market forces.
This task is complicated by the fact that housing markets are by no account
good textbook examples of neoclassical spot markets. Market imperfections
abound even in the absence of state intervention, particularly in the rental but
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1. See, for example, the textbook by Mills and Hamilton (1984).
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also in the owner-occupied housing market segment. Housing is a durable
good where prices are not necessarily defined by one-period spot market con-
ditions alone. Therefore, expectations based on imperfect foresight play an
important role in determining housing prices. High monetary and nonmonetary
transaction costs are involved when consumption is changed by moving, creat-
ing thin or even missing markets. Property rights of the rental unit are given
up only temporarily, giving the seller a strong incentive to care who the buyer
is. And since the tenant's characteristics will be revealed only after some time,
the problems of moral hazard and incomplete contracts hamper the functioning
of the invisible hand. As is well known, if the two sources of potential ineffi-
ciency—intrinsic market imperfections and government intervention—are
confused, inaccurate policy analysis and policy recommendations may occur
when first-best solutions are proposed in a second-best environment. An im-
portant task of this paper is therefore to disentangle the effects of government
intervention and the effects of intrinsic housing market imperfections.
Such an analysis is considerably eased by the possibility of comparing dif-
ferent countries. Empirical analysis of government intervention in one country
alone frequently faces the impossibility of a with-and-without analysis, due to
the fact that policy regime changes in a country are rare and that most housing
market interventions are federal functions. Hence, time series data often have
little temporal variation or are confounded by other historical changes, and
cross-sectional data in a single country feature virtually no policy variation at
all. In contrast, a cross-national comparison exploits the policy differences at
a given point or during a short period of time. I draw empirical conclusions by
comparing evidence in Germany and Japan with evidence from the United
States. In all of these three countries, there is substantial government involve-
ment in the housing markets. However, the programs that are in effect have
very different intentions and designs. Moreover, they apparently create very
different housing market outcomes. Examples are the different proportions of
owner-occupancy and different mobility rates in the three countries.
Of course, international comparisons suffer from the confounding effects of
cultural and attitudinal differences. The countries to be compared should not
be so unequal as to make comparisons meaningless but should be sufficiently
different to feature policy differences. This subtle balance restricts the choice
of countries and requires a careful analysis that controls for other confounding
factors. Germany and Japan have standards of living roughly comparable to
that of the United States. They have become somewhat "Americanized" since
World War II, particularly with respect to consumption patterns, but their his-
tories and geographic features have led to very different policies.
I set the stage in section 5.1 with a summary of stylized facts about the
German and the Japanese housing markets in comparison with the U.S. hous-
ing market. The policy discussion begins in section 5.2, with a brief description
and evaluation of five types of government programs: tenants' protection legis-121 Housing Market Regulations and Performance: U.S., Germany, and Japan
lation, housing allowance programs, the provision of public and social housing,
indirect subsidies toward homeownership, and transaction regulations. Not all
programs exist in all three countries, and some are designed quite differently;
but the basic framework is shared in all three countries. However, it is not my
intention to produce an exhaustive list of government programs in Germany,
Japan, and the United States. Rather, these fives types of government interven-
tion exemplify the main differences in how to approach housing policy in the
three countries and therefore allow an assessment of efficacy and side effects
of housing programs in general.
Sections 5.3 and 5.4 are devoted to more in-depth studies of the effects of
the German tenants' protection legislation and of the U.S. and German home-
ownership subsidies. I will relate the extent of these policies to measures of
housing market performance, particularly flexibility. This is a difficult part of
the paper, since measurement and even definition of economic performance
and flexibility are vague. I will look at indicators such as cyclical stability and
speed of adjustment to changing economic and demographic conditions on the
macroeconomic level, as well as at housing affordability and mobility at the
microeconomic level. The paper finishes with a synthesis in section 5.5.
5.1 Housing Market Facts in the United States, Germany, and Japan
This section summarizes the most important stylized facts about housing
markets in Germany, Japan and the United States. Data sources are detailed in
appendix A. For Germany, the data represent West Germany only. Due to its
former political system and the inability of the current government to resolve
the many land and house ownership disputes, the former East Germany still
features a housing "market" totally dominated by state-administrated rental
housing. However, the demographic structure of East Germany closely resem-
bles that of West Germany, so that when the intended privatization of land
and buildings finally takes place, East German housing consumption patterns
should converge quickly to the West German ones.
5.1.1 Background: Demography, Income, Savings
I begin with a brief summary of those background facts that are most im-
portant to characterize housing markets.
The expected future population size and structure are very different among
the three countries. While the population of the United States is projected to
increase during the next forty years, albeit at a smaller rate than between 1950
and now, Japan's population is expected to stabilize at around half the current
size of the U.S. population, and the German population is forecasted to decline
substantially to about 80 percent of its current size (table 5.1).
However, there are two reasons to be cautious when drawing quick conclu-
























Sources: OECD 1988, StAB, SUB, Kanemoto 1992.





























Sources: SUB, JHC, StAb, OECD 1988.
these projections. While the decline in the German population shown in table
5.1 (left panel) is about a third of a million per annum, actual net immigration
in 1989 exceeded 1.5 million (right panel). Immigration into Germany is very
high compared to the United States and Japan. It is expected to remain at about
1 million per year for the near future. Immigration into Japan is all but nonex-
isting. The United States, although much larger, has a lower absolute number
of immigrants. Even if one doubles the U.S. figures to roughly account for
unreported illegal immigration, per capita immigration into Germany still runs
about 2.5 times higher than total per capita immigration into the United States.
The second reason to be cautious drawing conclusions about housing is that
population counts do not translate one-to-one into household numbers. Table
5.2 (left panel) depicts the average household size in each of the three coun-
tries. Household size declines steadily in all countries and is substantially
lower in Germany than in the United States or Japan. Part of this is due to the
increasing percentage of elderly, who are most likely to live in single-person
households. As the right panel of table 5.2 shows, this development is not
likely to stop during the next forty years when the population aging process
will reach its peak. Population aging is very pronounced in Germany; it is also
very fast (although with a lower base) in Japan; and it is both slower and less
dramatic in the United States.
The most important economic determinant of individual housing choices is



















































Sources: StAB 1991,434, 843; StJB 1988, 554; Kanemoto 1992; World Bank, World Development
Record, table 30.
Note: The income distribution figures represent the share of total income in the respective percen-
tile. The data are from 1984 for West Germany, from 1979 for Japan, and from 1985 for the
United States.
United States, compared to both Germany and Japan, as table 5.3 demon-
strates. Amounts are in 1990 U.S. dollars converted by Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) purchasing power parities.
2
Due to different household sizes and tax structures, this translates into a 16
percent lower net household income in Japan compared to the United States,
and a 25 percent lower net household income in West Germany. Most of the
difference between Germany and the United States is due to the 20 percent
lower work hours in Germany and thus reflects different preferences for leisure
rather than welfare differences.
3
Moreover, income distributions differ dramatically (table 5.3, right panel).
While the lowest 20 percent in the income distribution hold 6.8 to 8.7 percent
of total income in Germany and Japan, they have only 4.7 percent in the United
States. Conversely, the richest decile earns a quarter of total income in the
United States but only 23.4 percent in Germany and only 22.4 percent in Japan.
It is necessary to take these income differences into account when comparing
housing consumption.
Finally, table 5.4 depicts the macroeconomic parameters most important for
the housing market: Until 1990, Japan featured high gross national product
(GNP) growth rates compared to the United States and Germany and a dramat-
ically higher aggregate savings rate. Since 1990, Japanese GNP growth has
somewhat slowed down, and the personal savings rate has fallen to the German
level. As is well known, the United States features not only very low savings
rates by international standards but also a unprecedented decline in savings
during the past twenty years.
2. Precisely, DM and yen amounts have been inflated to 1990 by the domestic consumer price
index (CPI) deflator (see Economic report of the president, statistical tables 1992, table B-105)
and then converted into dollars using the purchasing power parities listed in OECD (1992).




























Sources: EcRep, statistical tables; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Na-
tional Accounts.




Owner-Occupancy Total Per Person
United States 64.0% 149.0 m
2 56.0 m
2
West Germany 39.3 86.1 36.8
Japan 61.4 75.9 21.4
Sources: AHS 1987; GWZ 1987; JKDS 1988; and Kanemoto 1992.
Note: The Japanese numbers are multiplied by 1.15 to account for measurement differences in
floor space (see Kanemoto 1992).
5.1.2 Housing Consumption
There are striking differences in housing consumption among the three
countries. Most notable are the differences in tenure choice and dwelling size.
Table 5.5 presents 1987/88 data.
Ownership rates are high in Japan and the United States but very low in
Germany: 64 percent of all American households live in owner-occupied hous-
ing, 61.4 percent in Japan, but only 39.3 percent in Germany. Americans also
have the largest dwellings. Newly constructed houses have on average 149 m
2
in the United States, while German houses have on average 86 m
2 and Japanese
houses only 76 m
2. A correction for household size amplifies the relative
smallness of Japanese dwellings: A Japanese person consumes on average 21.4
m
2, while a German person has about 1.7 times as much and an American 2.6
times as much space as a Japanese.
Table 5.6 gives a more detailed decomposition of housing demand. The dif-
ferences in tenure choice are echoed in the differences between structure types.
Whereas in Germany single-family structures (including duplexes) and multi-
family structures have almost equal shares, single-family homes constitute the
overwhelming share of structures in the United States. In all three countries,
rental dwellings are much smaller than owner-occupied dwellings. This is









































































Sources: United States: AHS 1987. West Germany: GWZ 1987. Japan: JHC 1988; Kanemoto
1992.
Table 5.7 Mobility Rates















































Sources: AHS 1987; GWZ 1987; JHC 1988.
5.1.3 Mobility
The striking difference in internal mobility rates across countries is im-
portant to note for an analysis of market flexibility. Mobility rates in Germany
are about three times lower than in the United States (table 5.7). Although
German mobility is high at young ages, it virtually ceases after age 35. Of
course, U.S. mobility rates also decline with age. However, Americans aged126 Axel Borsch-Supan
75 and above move more frequently than heads of German households who
are over age 35.
4 Japanese mobility rates are, on average, in between those of
Germany and the United States. However, their age pattern is quite different.
Mobility among the young is much lower, because first-home buying age is
very late in Japan. In turn, mobility among the elderly is relatively high, mostly
due to the Japanese tradition of taking in elderly parents.
5
5.1.4 Housing Supply
I now turn to the supply side of the housing market. Table 5.8 presents the
suppliers of the standing stock. In addition to differences in rental-owner
shares, the rental housing segment itself features different suppliers. In Ger-
many, almost a tenth of the housing stock is provided by public or nonprofit
housing agencies. This percentage is a little lower in Japan, although, as a
share of rental housing, public providers are more important in Japan. This
contrasts with the United States, where the share of public housing is little
more than 1 percent of total housing. Section 5.2.1 will explain that public
housing in Germany and Japan is very different from public housing in the
United States. Japan also has a substantial share of employer-provided hous-
ing, another segment cushioned from free-market mechanisms.
In all three countries, new construction is a small proportion of the total
supply. Table 5.9 shows that this is particularly true for West Germany, while
Japan had the most active new-construction segment. To account for the differ-
ent business cycle phases in the three countries, I took averages from 1974 to
1988. During this time and on a per capita basis, U.S. construction activity was
60 percent of the Japanese, and the German about one-half. Neither Germany
nor the United States ever reached new-construction activities as intense as the
Japanese (almost 14 units per 1,000 inhabitants in 1988) nor did the U.S. and
Japan ever drop as low as Germany in 1988 (only 3.4 units per 1,000 inhab-
itants).
5.1.5 Housing Market
Housing market features such as vacancy rates and the size of the second-
hand market are very different in the three countries. The left panel of table
5.10 depicts vacancy rates for the three countries. The German vacancy rate is
very low in comparison to both Japan and the United States. This vacancy rate
fluctuates somewhat during the business cycle. However, the relative differ-
ences among the three countries are remarkably stable.
Germany and Japan have very thin second-hand markets in the single-family
home market segment, in comparison to the United States. The right panel of
table 5.10 displays the number of existing home sales, both absolute and rela-
4. The mobility rate for Germans aged thirty-five and above is 3.7 percent (SOEP 1987).
5. Regarding transactions costs, it is noteworthy that built-in kitchens are commonly part of
rented dwellings in the United States, while they commonly belong to the household in Germany
and Japan and are therefore being moved or sold in case of a move.127
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Sources: StAb 1991; StBA (FS5.1) 1989; JHC 1988.
Note: Numbers in parentheses are percentages of rental housing.
Table 5.9 New Construction (completed units), 1974-1988
Average Minimum Maximum
Units Per Units Per Units Per




























Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Construction Review; StBA(FS-5.1) 1989; JHC 1988;
Kanemoto 1992.
Note: Per capita refers to number of newly constructed units per one thousand inhabitants.




















Sources: AHS 1987 and StAb 1991; StJB 1988; JKDS 1990.
Note: The Japanese vacancy rate includes vacant second homes and unusable units.
tive to the number of households. In the United States, this market is almost
fifteen times larger than in Germany and about ten times larger than in Japan.
While it is very common in the United States to buy a used home, little more
than 20 percent of homeowners do this in Germany. Most German first-home
buyers move into new custom-built houses.
In summary, Germany has a relatively small market of newly built houses,
a very thin second-hand market of single-family homes, and a thin rental seg-
ment since the vacancy rate is dominated by the rental sector. In this respect,
it is very different from both Japan and the United States. Of course, this differ-
ence is mirrored in the low mobility rate.128 Axel Borsch-Supan
5.1.6 Housing Prices
To conclude this tour d'horizon on U.S., German, and Japanese housing
markets, table 5.11 presents housing prices in relation to income. At a first and
superficial glance (columns 1 and 2), housing affordability does not seem to
differ much across the three countries. However, this picture is deceiving. For
one, the differences in metropolitan areas are much larger. Kanemoto (1992)
reports that housing prices in Tokyo and Osaka are about twice as large as
in New York and Los Angeles. Moreover, table 5.11 reports expenditures not
corrected for differences in dwelling size and quality. They therefore say little
about housing prices. In fact, as shown above, Japanese houses are much
smaller than U.S. and German ones. I therefore calculate the price per square
meter in relation to annual household income (column 3). Measured this way,
housing is on average more than twice as expensive in Japan and Germany as
in the United States.
A more careful computation for metropolitan areas in the United States and
West Germany is presented by Borsch-Supan (1985) and is based on quality
corrections by hedonic regressions for 1978.
6 Quality-corrected structure costs
were about 80 percent higher in German cities than in U.S. Standard Metropol-
itan Statistical Areas (SMSAs). The main factor, however, is the 4.5-fold
higher average price of land in German cities leading to a 40 percent share of
land in total house values. The higher prices result in about 30 percent less
consumption of housing (measured as a hedonic index composed of space and
other housing quality attributes) and more than 40 percent less consumption
of land.
7
Table 5.12 provides a rough calculation of average land price and its changes
over time in relation to income. Land values were computed from national
accounting data and refer to arable land. Arable land is a small proportion of
land in Japan, a much larger proportion in the United States, and virtually all
land in Germany. It is also noteworthy that Japanese land values are dominated
by the Tokyo area, while U.S. land values include substantial quantities of ag-
ricultural land.
Two observations stand out in table 5.12. First, Japan experienced a dramatic
increase in land prices that was unparalleled in the United States and Germany.
Second, arable land prices in 1988 are more than ten-fold in Germany and
more than two hundred-fold in Japan in comparison to the United States. The
stark contrast between the scarcity of land in Japan and central Europe and
the abundance of land in North America is one of the basic facts that shape
the housing markets in the three countries.
6. Based on the American Housing Survey (AHS) and the Wohnungsstichprobe (Housing Cen-
sus) in 1978. Since then, Germany has not collected data on housing quality and household charac-
teristics comparable to the AHS.
7. Average lot size in the United States is 1,578 m
2, in Germany only 922 m
2.129 Housing Market Regulations and Performance: U.S., Germany, and Japan
Table 5.11 Housing Expenditures and Affordability of New Housing
Housing New-House Price Price per m
2
Expenditure Divided by Divided by
Share Annual income Annual Income
United States (1987) 19.6% 3.4 0.023
West Germany (1986) 21.1 4.6 0.053
Japan (1989) 18.6 4.4 0.058










Land Value per Arable km

















Sources: Author's calculations based on Boone and Sachs 1989. For size of arable land: Kanemoto
1992,667.
5.2 Housing Policies in the United States, Germany, and Japan
The discussion in the preceding section shows that the differences in hous-
ing consumption among the three countries are to some degree explainable by
the relative scarcity of land in Japan and Germany, resulting in high land prices
and substitution toward smaller dwelling sizes in comparison to the United
States. One might be tempted to attribute the difference in the proportion of
owner-occupied (and mostly single-family) homes between Germany and the
United States to the same mechanism—if it were not for the large proportion
of owner-occupied houses in Japan. Similarly, the striking differences in mo-
bility and vacancy rates rates do not fit into such a simple explanation.
My main claim in this paper is that many differences are, to a large degree,
generated by housing policies, particularly by homeownership subsidies and
rental housing regulations. To this end, this section provides a brief description
of the main housing policy programs in effect in the three countries since the
midseventies.
8 Each subsection concludes with a short evaluation in terms of
social protection and economic flexibility, and appendix B provides a summary
of the programs.
8. Since housing choices are long-term decisions, it is important to look at the recent past as
well as the current policy environment.130 Axel Borsch-Supan
5.2.1 Public and Social Housing
The very first program to protect low-income households in terms of hous-
ing needs in the United States was the public housing program enacted in 1937.
The public housing program was massive in the 1960s (the stock almost dou-
bled from 593,000 units in 1960 to 1.1 million units ten years later) but has
lost its importance since then. It never provided state-supplied housing for
more than a small proportion of households. In 1960, 1.12 percent of all hous-
ing units were public housing, 1.82 percent ten years later at its peak, 1.64
percent in 1980, and only 1.41 percent in 1988.
As shown in table 5.8, Germany and Japan have considerably larger propor-
tions of public and nonprofit housing. The associated programs, however, are
very different from the U.S. public housing program.
German "social housing" is provided for by private nonprofit organizations
that effectively operate under a rate-of-return constraint. Social housing is
means-tested, but this test is applied only when households move into the unit.
A large proportion of social housing is, in fact, used by households who have
advanced into the middle class since their move. Moreover, unlike the concen-
trated multiunit public housing buildings in the United States, social housing
in Germany is scattered throughout the community and is frequently located
in small buildings.
In Japan, about a third of the public housing is not means-tested at all. Even
in the most stringent means-tested "type 2 public housing," the annual income
limit is $15,000.
9
The problems of the U.S. public housing program are well-known. It is a
textbook example (e.g., Mills and Hamilton 1984) of a policy failure because
it failed to provided adequate housing and at the same time hindered economic
flexibility. It turned out an economic failure because it was too expensive per
housing unit provided—an advantage only to the construction industry. And it
was a social failure because it accelerated the formation of ghettos and fostered
discrimination. The German social housing program shares the problems of
high supply costs (Barnbrook and Mayo 1985). It does, however, provide
decent housing for low-income families—actually, sufficiently decent to at-
tract many middle-class misusers of the program.
5.2.2 Rental Housing Subsidies
Private rental housing is indirectly subsidized in the three countries, primar-
ily by subsidies to the construction of new multifamily homes and by acceler-
ated depreciation schedules. In all three countries, expenses related to the pro-
vision of rental housing (including mortgage interest and depreciation) are
deducted from rental income. Moreover, these expenses can often be used to
9. Precisely, 4,287,999 yen for type 1 and 3,359,999 yen for type 2 public rental housing (Ka-
nemoto 1992).131 Housing Market Regulations and Performance: U.S., Germany, and Japan
offset income other than rental income. This mechanism is regarded as the
most important subsidy toward rental housing and provides a scheme to arbi-
trage income taxes between renters with low marginal tax rates and landlords
with high marginal tax rates.
1
0 Poterba (1984) provides a theoretical model of
tenure selection along these lines.
Currently, the tax incentives for rental housing are not symmetric to those
for owner-occupancy (see section 5.2.4). They are actually substantially lower.
In the United States, the accelerated depreciation schedule for rental housing
was abolished in the 1986 Tax Reform Act." Moreover, capital gains on rented
property are taxed in the United States, while owner-occupiers enjoy rollover
provisions; and the transferability of tax losses to other income sources has
been limited in the United States. Higher subsidies apply when housing is sup-




In Germany, owner-occupiers can use faster depreciation schedules than
owners of rental property (although both are accelerated).
1
3 There is no capital
gains tax unless real estate is sold within two years after purchase. Real estate
losses can be used to offset other income without limitation. Similar to the
U.S. Section 8 programs, higher subsidies apply if apartments are rented to
low-income households.
Germany, unlike Japan and the United States, has adopted a direct subsidy
of rental housing consumption in form of housing allowances (Wohngeld).
14
German housing allowances are fairly widespread entitlements. They cover
about 11 percent of all renters (StJB 1990). About a third of all recipients are
pensioners. The subsidy depends on the rent paid, income, and family size,
similar to the housing gap formula applied in the U.S. Experimental Housing
Allowances Program. The subsidy is rather deep: the average subsidy accounts
for 33.2 percent of total rental expenditures.
It is important to note that although the amount of housing allowances
granted is tied to the actual rent, housing allowances are paid as cash transfers
to the household, not to the landlord. Therefore, two essential differences stand
out in comparison with the rental subsidies in the United States. First, German
housing allowances are entitlements, as opposed to the U.S. Section 8 certifi-
10. Rosen (1992, 436). Whether this is regarded as a subsidy depends on how comprehensive
an income definition one applies.
11. Poterba (1992) provides an updated analysis of the effects of the 1986 Tax Reform Act on
housing investment.
12. CBO (1988) provides a synopsis of the many programs that are and were in effect. The
variants of the Section 8 program account for 71 percent of all rental housing subsidies.
13. However, Germany recently has introduced an emergency housing program with an acceler-
ated depreciation schedule for newly built rental housing.
14. A large number of Japanese employers pay housing allowances. However, there is no tax
incentive involved, as they constitute taxable income for the worker and are treated like wages for
the firm. Employers pay nontaxable commuting allowances that are substantial. Their effect on
housing consumption in terms of tenure and size is only indirect.132 Axel Borsch-Supan
cates, which are rationed. Second, housing allowances are cash income, while
most of the Section 8 certificates are in kind.
1
5
In terms of social protection, the German housing allowances system has
succeeded in preventing low-income families from living in lower than stan-
dard quality houses. Welfare recipients are able to cover their rent almost com-
pletely by housing allowances. This is unlike the United States, where the Con-
gressional Budget Office classifies 36 percent of low-income households as
having affordability problems and 14 percent as living in substandard housing
(CBO 1988).
Because the German housing allowances are like cash income, distortions
to consumption choices are small, at least in comparison to in-kind transfers.
Moreover, discrimination is less of an issue, because housing allowances are
granted to a large income segment and recipients do not have to reveal their
status. In this respect, economic flexibility—interpreted here as noninterfer-
ence in consumer and supplier choices—does not appear to be tangibly ham-
pered by the German housing allowances program.
5.2.3 Rental Housing Market Regulations
There is no general tenants' legislation in the United States. Rent and evic-
tion control legislation is at the discretion of the state or municipal level of
jurisdiction. Some states and municipalities have enacted rather strict rent and
eviction controls (most prominently New York), but most states and munici-
palities have none.
In addition to direct and indirect subsidies, Germany and Japan also regulate
the rental housing market by tenants' protection legislations. In Germany, this
legislation consists of two provisions. First, the law prohibits eviction of ten-
ants aside from exceptional circumstances such as refusal to pay rent. Second,
rent increases are limited by the average rent increase in the community. In
addition, they are capped at 30 percent in three years. However, the initial rent
level is unregulated. (More detail is provided in section 5.3.)
Japan has a more informal, but de facto even stricter rent and eviction con-
trol than Germany has.
1
6 Rental contracts are shielded by a special law from
the general liberty of contract provisions in the Japanese civil law. This implies
that a landlord must go to court and prove a "just cause" to change the contract
(e.g., to increase the rent or to evict the tenant). In determining a just cause,
the court compares the "need" of the tenant with that of the landlord. Obvi-
ously, few landlords are needier than their tenants. This clause therefore ap-
plies essentially only to tenants not paying rent. For land the law specifies a
15. The new Section 8 program allows renters to keep the difference between maximum eligible
subsidy and actual rent. About 32 percent of Section 8 certificates are subject to this program
variant.
16. The law was liberalized in 1991. Except for the possibility of legal temporary leases in the
case of temporary job transfers (including sabbaticals), the "liberation" appears rather marginal.
See Kanemoto (1991).133 Housing Market Regulations and Performance: U.S., Germany, and Japan
thirty-year contract period, none for housing. Specifying a short contract pe-
riod, even if agreed to by both parties, is deemed ineffective. This leads to the
absurd situation that there is no guarantee that a landlord can return to the unit
after a temporary rental (e.g., during a sabbatical).
The rent control part of the Japanese tenants' protection legislation is similar
to the German one. Initial rents are determined freely between owner and ten-
ant, but rent increases thereafter must go through court, which is time consum-
ing and costly. As in clauses specifying contract periods, the court may deem
invalid all provisions in the contract that specify rent increases, even if both
parties have originally agreed on such clauses.
Although there are many similarities between the Japanese and the German
tenants' protection legislation, there is a crucial difference that renders the Jap-
anese legislation much stricter. The burden of proof is on the tenant's side in
Germany, while in Japan the landlord has to go to court.
It appears obvious that the stringent German and Japanese tenants' protec-
tion laws impede economic flexibility. Many Japanese authors claim that the
Japanese tenants' protection legislation is the main cause for the scarcity of
rental housing in Japan (Kanemoto 1992). In Germany, however, the balance
between rental and owner-occupied housing is reversed. Thus, the claim of
limited economic flexibility is less convincing. Whether tenants' protection
laws achieve social protection is also not clear. Protection from arbitrary evic-
tion may come at high rent levels and depressed supply, consequences of im-
peded economic flexibility. Section 5.3 will therefore provide an extended
analysis of the effectiveness of tenants' protection legislation in Germany and




In spite of the many subsidies and regulations in the rental segment of the
housing market, the major impact of housing policies from a U.S. perspective
is actually in the owner-occupied market segment. In the United States, mort-
gage interest for home and land can be deducted from personal income taxes.
The associated tax losses are ten times as large as all rental subsidies, including
the public housing program. In Germany, accelerated accounting depreciation
of the building can be deducted from personal income taxes, and a substantial
tax credit is given to families with children who build new owner-occupied
homes. In addition, savings toward down payments are subsidized. Japan sub-
sidizes housing primarily by low-interest loans. The rationing rules favor
people who buy a new house for themselves or build their own new house. In
addition, Japan has a small tax credit for owner-occupancy. Imputed rental
income escapes taxation in all three countries. Capital gains of owner-
occupancy are not taxed in Germany and remain effectively tax free in the
United States.
17. Unfortunately, there are no good microdata to extend this analysis to Japan.134 Axel Borsch-Supan
More details of the applicable homeownership subsidies are provided in sec-
tion 5.4. They were substantially higher in the United States than in Germany,
although this difference has decreased due to recent changes in the tax laws.
Due to the progressive tax structure, homeownership subsidies generally favor
the middle class and the rich. Whether they also socially protect the poor de-
pends on the highly controversial filtering effect. Because homeownership
subsidies substantially exceed the subsidies toward rental housing, they are
tilting the tenure choice toward owner-occupancy, which does not clearly hin-
der economic flexibility. By smoothing housing consumption over the business
cycle, the subsidies may actually foster economic flexibility. Section 5.4 pro-
vides a more extended analysis.
5.2.5 Owner-Occupied Housing Market Regulations
Many regulations constrain consumption choices also in the owner-
occupied housing market segment. Land use regulations, building codes, and
zoning rules are interesting subjects for an investigation of the balance between
social protection and economic flexibility but are beyond the scope of this pa-
per (e.g., see Borsch-Supan, Kanemoto, and Stahl 1992).
Worth pointing out, however, are the very high transaction taxes accompa-
nying a real estate sale in Japan. Three types of taxes are due: a real estate
acquisition tax, a registration tax, and a stamp duty. For used houses, these
taxes amount to between 8 and 10 percent of assessed values, which in turn
are reconstruction costs minus a generous allowance for depreciation; the total
is about 2 percent for newly constructed houses.
1
8 The effect of these transac-
tion taxes on economic flexibility is clearly visible in table 5.10. Japan has
only about 10 percent of the existing-home sales in the United States relative
to the number of households.
Note that Germany has even less of a second-hand market than Japan. How-
ever, neither Germany nor the United States has substantial transaction taxes.
As with the homeownership rates, one explanation alone does not explain all
country-specific phenomena in these international comparisons.
5.3 Effects of Tenants' Protection Legislation
Tenants' protection legislation—the combination of rent controls and prohi-
bition of eviction—is an intervention that quite prominently exemplifies the
tension between social protection and economic flexibility.
Proponents of social protection claim that the legislation shields helpless
tenants from exploitation and arbitrary eviction. They argue that it is necessary
18. The real estate acquisition tax is 3 percent for residential land and structures. The registra-
tion tax is 5 percent, and the stamp duty is 60,000 yen for the median-valued house (Kanemoto
1992).135 Housing Market Regulations and Performance: U.S., Germany, and Japan
to counterbalance the weak position of a tenant in a seller's market with a
regulate pricing scheme. Specifically, proponents claim that without price reg-
ulation a landlord can exploit the exit barriers of high moving costs, thus gain-
ing local monopoly power with the opportunity to raise rents. Proponents of
the legislation also argue that the legislation would restrict or eliminate arbi-
trary and discriminatory eviction, which inflicts high moving costs on the
tenants.
In terms of economic flexibility, on the other hand, opponents of tenants'
protection legislation argue that crucial property rights—the right to evict an
unpleasant tenant—are only given up against compensation for the money
value of those rights. This would result in higher rents and depressed supply,
which they claim will ultimately reduce tenants' utility. Opponents of the legis-
lation also claim that it deters mobility and therefore creates housing market
inflexibility in times of economic and demographic changes.
The aim of this section is an assessment of the positive and normative effects
of tenants' protection legislation. I will first describe the German tenants' pro-
tection legislation and discuss its potential impacts on rent schedules, housing
supply, and welfare. I will then exploit the diversity of U.S. rent and eviction
regulations to evaluate the actual impact.
5.3.1 The German Tenants' Protection Legislation
In Germany, the Wohnraumkiindigungsschutzgesetz (Law for the Protection
of Tenants from Arbitrary Eviction) governs rental contracts. Versions of this
law have been in effect since 1971. The law was strengthened in 1975, then
weakened in 1983 and again in 1987, when short-term leases and prearranged
rent changes were permitted. The law consists of two provisions. First, eviction
is prohibited except under three conditions. Eviction is permitted (1) if the
tenant severely breaches the contract (e.g., does not pay the rent); (2) if the
landlord or a close relative wants to move into the unit and has a just cause for
doing so; or (3) if the landlord is severely inhibited in the appropriate economic
usage of his property (e.g., conversion into office space in areas assigned by
zoning laws as a business district). The courts have been very restrictive on the
two latter clauses and rarely permit such evictions.
The rent is not regulated when a new tenant moves in (usury is prohibited
by general law). However, the second provision of the law indexes the rent for
the sitting tenant. This rent regulation permits the landlord to pass on only cost
increases, the annuitized value of upgrading and modernization expenses, and
some part of general housing appreciation. Any rent increase is subject to the
following procedure: The landlord has to quote the rent of three comparable
units in the neighborhood. The landlord can then raise the rent up to the aver-
age rent of these units unless the rent increase exceeds 20 percent (nominally)
within the last three years (30 percent before 1987). This procedure is time
consuming, particularly if the tenant appeals (e.g., because the tenant has de-
tected a cheaper comparable unit in the neighborhood). Therefore, the rent136 Axel Borsch-Supan
level for sitting tenants is effectively the lagged rent of comparable newly
rented units (assuming a steady nominal rent increase).
5.3.2 Effects: Theory
There has been a long debate about the effects of rent and eviction control
(e.g., the surveys of Olsen [1972, 1987]). Clearly, in a perfect neoclassical
market any kind of restriction of property rights interferes with the pareto effi-
cient market equilibrium. Hence, there is always a transfer scheme that could
offset potential losses by renters and make both tenants and landlords better
off if such controls were abandoned. This is the basic argument of the oppo-
nents of tenants' protection legislation.
In the case of the German (and the Japanese) legislation, which features free
initial rents, this line of reasoning needs sophistication. Eekhoff (1981) shows
that the primary effect of introducing this price regulation is a heavily front-
loaded payment schedule, depicted in figure 5.1, which keeps profits at the
prelegislation level. Losses (area B in fig. 5.1) in the second phase of the lease
are compensated for by profits (area A) from the high initial rent in the first
phase. The resulting actual rent profile is indicated by the bold horizontal line.
The argument made most frequently by opponents of tenants' protection
legislation—namely, that the landlord's reduced profit expectations will reduce












Fig. 5.1 Effect of price regulation
Source: Adapted from Eeckhoff 1981.
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therefore incorrect in a perfect neoclassical environment. It is incorrect be-
cause initial rents can always be set sufficiently high to equilibrate the losses
(are B in fig. 5.1) and the profits (area A). The legislation changes the timing
of the rent streams but not their present discounted value. Hence, at least for
perfectly anticipated length of tenure and perfect capital markets, there will be
no effect on the landlords' profits or the tenant's utility.
The argument may, however, work in an imperfect rental housing market.
Eekhoff (1981) points out that only the risk-neutral landlord is able to diversify
the risk of having a tenant excessively enjoying his indexed rent in the second
phase of his tenure. A risk-averse landlord, however, will charge a premium
for this risk, resulting in even higher initial rents, which will reduce the ten-
ant's utility.
Eckart (1983) presents another handle that makes the argument against ten-
ants' protection work. The presence of liquidity constraints creates an inter-
temporal distortion because the tenant will be restricted in his or her housing
consumption by the large initial rent. Eckart shows that under the assumption
of either an expectation of increasing real rents or a perfectly elastic supply,
the tenants' utility will indeed be reduced. However, Eckart also gives condi-
tions under which this distortion actually increases the tenant's utility, contrary
to the common belief and the assertions in Eekhoff (1981).
These arguments show that an assessment of the welfare effects of rent and
eviction control is complicated and potentially ambiguous in a second-best
world. In a highly stylized rental housing market model (Bbrsch-Supan 1986),
I combine several second-best features with the main ingredients of the Ger-
man tenants' protection legislation. These features include heterogeneity of
landlords and tenants, and incomplete and asymmetric information. More pre-
cisely, tenants and landlords may belong to different types who do not like
each other but cannot determine at the time of contract whether they match.
Moreover, tenants and landlords cannot specify contracts that are contingent
on a match or mismatch because this is subjective and cannot be verified in
court. Nor can tenants and landlords form contracts that are binding for both
sides because this is considered unethical in the court.
1
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The main result of this model is that tenants' protection legislation may or
may not be pareto improving, depending on the balance between the mobility
costs to the tenant who is evicted and the costs of a bad tenant to the landlord
who is prohibited from evicting. If psychic and monetary moving costs in-
flicted on the evicted tenant are high, tenants' protection legislation is pareto
improving. However, if the psychic and monetary costs inflicted on the land-
lord who is forced to keep a costly or unpleasant tenant are high, tenants'
protection legislation reduces welfare.
19. In fact, tenants may always breach a rental contract as long as they provide a successor
tenant. The lack of binding contracts is the crucial market failure in this model (see Schwager
1991).138 Axel Borsch-Supan
In conclusion, theory alone cannot determine whether the German-type rent
and eviction control is indeed a social protection of tenants against their land-
lords' greed or, in turn, whether rent and eviction control is an obstacle to the
invisible hand that would otherwise achieve efficiency.
5.3.2 Effects: Evidence in West Germany
One implication of an effective German-type rent and eviction control is the
growing gap between spot market rents and rents of sitting tenants, depicted
in figure 5.1. In the absence of rent and eviction controls, landlords may in-
crease the rent of sitting tenants because they can exploit their local monopoly
power. I will therefore construct an empirical test of the efficacy of rent and
eviction control, based on the relation between rent levels of sitting tenants
and their length of tenure. The test consists in relating the rent differential
between new and sitting tenants to the existence of rent and eviction control.
If these controls were effective, the rent differential should be large in compari-
son to areas without rent and eviction control.
The gap between spot market rents and rents of sitting tenants—commonly
termed tenure discount—can be estimated from long panel data or from cross-
sectional data. In cross-sectional data this is measured as the difference in rent
paid for comparable units by households that moved in at different times. Units
are kept comparable by controlling for housing quality and neighborhood char-
acteristics as well as tenants' and landlords' characteristics by applying he-
donic regression techniques. A function of the form R = f(t; X) is estimated in
which the observed rent R depends on the length of tenure t, holding the vector
X of housing quality, neighborhood, tenant, and landlord characteristics con-
stant. Behring, Borsch-Supan, and Goldrian (1988) estimate a nonlinear rent
profile for sitting tenants relative to the spot market rent level, based on 1 per-
cent of West German households in 1978. The results, stratified by degree of
urbanization, are displayed in table 5.13.
After one year of tenure, tenants pay 2 percent less rent than new tenants in
comparable units. The discounts then increase quickly in the first five years of
tenure, until they level off for very long lengths of tenure. They are essentially





































Source: Behring, Borsch-Supan, and Goldrian 1988.139 Housing Market Regulations and Performance: U.S., Germany, and Japan
flat after a tenure of fourteen years and amount to more than a quarter of the
rent a new tenant would pay.
The regression suffers from selectivity bias since high-rent contracts are
more likely to be terminated than low-rent contracts. In order to perform a
Heckman-type correction, data from at least two cross sections are required.
Unfortunately no comparable German data set in a second year is available.
Using U.S. data, Guasch and Marshall (1983) were able to perform such a
selectivity correction. Their evidence, however, is inconclusive. Judging from
their results, it appears most likely that positive, possibly smaller, tenure dis-
counts would remain after a correction in the German data.
2
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The German tenants' protection legislation seems to be perfectly reflected
in German rent profiles. However, this analysis suffers from the missing count-
erf actual. This counterfactual can only be provided by housing markets with-
out tenants' protection legislation.
5.3.3 Rent Control in the United States
As opposed to Germany and Japan, there is no general tenants' legislation
in the United States. Rent and eviction control legislation is at the discretion
of the state or municipality. Some states and municipalities in the United States
have enacted rather strict rent and eviction controls, but most have none and
therefore do provide the counterf actual mentioned above.
Information about the presence of controls in the Standard Metropolitan Sta-
tistical Areas (SMSAs) of the United States during the years 1974-77 was
collected by Baird (1980), Thibodeau (1981), and the National Multi-Housing
Council (1982).
Since eviction and rent control laws vary a great deal across municipalities,
I do not describe them in detail here. A rather comprehensive list can be found
in the publications of the National Multi-Housing Council.
From this information, I construct two measures to assess whether the rental
housing market in a specific SMSA was influenced by rent or eviction control.
The stricter measure includes all SMSAs in which rent and eviction control
was in effect in at least one jurisdiction; the weaker measure also includes
SMSAs in which rent and eviction control was pending. Pending means that
state legislation had been enacted so that municipalities could easily introduce
rent and eviction control. Also included in this category are SMSAs in which
rent control was a hot political issue or was rejected only by a small margin in
the municipal government. The idea of this second category is to include all
SMSAs in which landlords effectively faced or at least perceived an incentive
to restrain themselves when pondering rent increases or eviction.
20. Ideally, one should analyze rent profiles over time for a given unit. This kind of panel data
is not available. While the American Housing Survey provides geographic and structural informa-
tion, units cannot be linked over time. In turn, panels such as the U.S. PSID and the German SOEP
do not have sufficient structural information and do not disclose the municipality. Hence, I cannot
test the interesting hypothesis that in areas with rent control larger tenure discounts will occur over
time in the presence of (unexpected) housing price increases.140 Axel Borsch-Supan
5.3.4 Effects: Evidence in the United States
Using the same methodology as in Germany, I employ estimated tenure dis-
counts for fifty-nine Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas based on hedonic
regressions performed by Malpezzi, Ozanne, and Thibodeau (1980).
2
I The rent
profiles are based on the Annual Housing Surveys 1974-77 and were computed
from the same cross-sectional hedonic specification as those by Behring,
Borsch-Supan, and Goldrian for West Germany. The fifty-nine SMSAs are then
categorized by their rent control legislation according to the two measures de-
scribed in section 5.3.3.
Table 5.14 presents the results for a ten-year tenure length. The estimated
shape is the same as in Germany: The percentage discounts increase quickly
in the first five years of tenure, then level off and are essentially flat after
twelve-fifteen years. As stated earlier, the percentages test the hypothesis that
at long tenures rental prices will be lower in areas with rent and eviction con-
trol. The result, however, is astounding. Large and significant tenure discounts
are also present in metropolitan areas in the United States in which rent and
eviction control has never been in effect and which exemplify the spirit of free
enterprise, such as Phoenix, Arizona. Average and median tenure discounts are
highest where rent and eviction control is pending, but they are lowest where
rent and eviction control is in effect. The difference between SMSAs com-
pletely with and without rent control is not statistically significant. Figure 5.2
plots the distribution of tenure discounts. The scatter plots for SMSAs with
enacted and without any rent control are very similar. Moreover, a regression
of the city-specific tenure discounts controlling for the number of housing
units per capita, new construction per capita, net immigration rate, per capita
income, and unemployment rate shows a significant effect of pending controls
but cannot reject the hypothesis that tenure discounts are unaffected by rent
and eviction control actually in place (see table 5.15).
These numbers do not provide convincing evidence that tenants' protection
is a major explanation of tenure discounts. We have to accept them as a univer-
sal and independent phenomenon of rental housing markets. On average, land-
lords give discounts for a sitting tenant rather than exploit their monopoly
power in order to extract the value of moving costs. To be precise, the result
says that, whatever their causes, discounts cannot significantly be associated
with rent and eviction control.
The theoretical analysis in Borsch-Supan (1986) provides a motivation for
tenure discounts in an unregulated rental housing market: Landlords pay pre-
miums to keep pleasant tenants from moving, because their move incurs a posi-
tive probability of drawing an unpleasant tenant.
21. Follain and Malpezzi (1980) and Goodman and Kawai (1982) estimate tenure discounts as
a linear function of the length of tenure and arrive at much lower estimates. Due to the linearity,
the estimates of Follain and Malpezzi tend to be biased downward, whereas the specification by
Malpezzi, Ozanne, and Thibodeau (1980) suggests an upward bias due to the colinearity with their
age-of-dwelling variable. Barnett (1979), Noland (1980), and Lowry (1981) reproduce estimates
almost identical to the nonlinear specification of table 5.14.141 Housing Market Regulations and Performance: U.S., Germany, and Japan
Table 5.14 Tenure Discounts and Rent Control in the United States, 1974-1977
SMSAs without Enacted or Pending























































































































































Note: Standard deviation denotes standard deviation of the mean.
Source: Author's computations (see text).142 Axel Borsch-Supan
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Fig. 5.2 Tenure discounts after 10 years in 59 U.S. SMSAs
Source: Author's computations.
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Note: Ordinary least squares.
The lack of differences between SMSAs with and without controls does not
exclude the existence of a minority of landlords who do not grant tenure dis-
counts but rather exploit their local monopoly. In this sense, tenants' protection
legislation provides social protection as an insurance for the tenant who does
not know a priori which type of landlord is offering the lease.
Has rent and eviction control hindered economic flexibility? We have two
yardsticks by which to measure economic flexibility in this respect. First, we
look at whether mobility is suppressed by an effective rent and eviction con-
trol. Second, we investigate how the supply of rental housing reacts to differ-
ences in the stringency of the tenants' protection legislation.
The cross-national evidence and time series evidence on mobility rates con-
tradict each other. As depicted in table 5.7, mobility rates are much lower in
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Fig. 5.3 German mobility rates (per thousand households)
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Fig. 5.4 New construction in Germany (thousands of units)
Source: StBA (FS-5.1).
of the tenants' protection legislation in these countries. However, German time
series data display no reaction in mobility rates when the law was introduced
in 1971 and no response to the liberalization of the tenants' protection legisla-
tion after the change of government in 1983 and after the change in the law in
1987 (fig. 5.3). Rather, mobility rates continued their secular decline. Simi-
larly, the supply of newly constructed rental housing buildings was unaffected
by changes in the law (fig. 5.4). Weighing the cross-national against the time
series evidence, I conclude that the case against tenants' protection rests on
weak empirical grounds.144 Axel Borsch-Supan
5.4 The Effects of Homeownership Subsidies
One might wonder why a section on homeownership subsidies belongs in a
paper on social protection and economic flexibility. As already mentioned in
section 5.2.4, homeownership subsidies protect mainly the incomes of those
households who have sufficiently high marginal tax rates to actually be able to
apply the tax advantages. However, because the homeownership subsidies are
quantitatively so important and because it is claimed that they, although indi-
rectly, also help the poor, it is imperative to study them in more detail.
5.4.1 Homeownership Subsidies in the United States
The reduction in the personal income tax liability for owner-occupiers is the
most prominent housing policy instrument in the United States. The United
States subsidizes owner-occupancy by the deduction of mortgage interest.
There is no upper limit on the deductible amount. However, the subsidy is
effective only when deductions are itemized, wiping out this subsidy for low-
income families. On the other end of the income distribution, the value of this
subsidy is marginally reduced by the itemized-deduction phaseout.
2
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In addition, imputed rental income is not taxed, while property taxes can be
deducted from personal income taxes. Property taxes can be substantial in the
United States, even after deduction from the federal personal income tax.
Nominal property tax rates range from 0.0 to 6.0 percent. They are at the dis-
cretion of the municipalities but, in some states, are capped by upper limits
set by the state legislation. Because of generous rollover provisions, housing
appreciation effectively escapes the U.S. capital gains taxation.
5.4.2 Homeownership Subsidies in Germany
In Germany the main mechanism for subsidizing homeownership is an ac-
celerated depreciation allowance that can be deducted from federal income
taxes.
2
3 The accelerated depreciation schedule provides, for eight years, a de-
duction of 5 percent of structure costs below $150,000.
2
4 It is applicable only
to owner-occupied homes. Each individual can use this schedule only once in
his or her life. Once the eight years are over, no further depreciation allowance
is granted. It is important to note that this tax write-off depends on the value
of the structure but not on the value of the land and that it is independent of
the loan-to-value ratio. This changes the optimal capital-to-land ratio and tilts
the symmetry between borrowing and lending.
Mortgage interest is deductible for rented buildings but generally not for
owner-occupied homes. From time to time, however, when the government
22. This phaseout eliminates up to 20 percent of the deductions.
23. There are three basic depreciation schedules in Germany: an "accelerated schedule" with a
cap on time and value, a "degressive schedule" applicable only to new structures, and the omnibus
linear depreciation schedule. The first one is not applicable for rented property.
24. The temporary emergency housing act increased this percentage to 6 for the first four years.145 Housing Market Regulations and Performance: U.S., Germany, and Japan
feels that housing construction needs more encouragement, the government
introduces temporary mortgage interest deduction programs. At the end of
1991, for example, the German government announced that for a limited time
(until repeal) it will be possible to deduct up to $5,500 annually of mortgage
interest payments during the first three years of a newly constructed building.
A similar program was in effect from 1983 through 1987.
Families with children enjoy another important tax advantage if they build
a new home and claim the accelerated depreciation deduction. For each child,
this credit is $1,800 annually for eight years.
Imputed rental income of owner-occupancy is not taxed in Germany. Ger-
many has a negligible property tax, due to both low assessed values and low
nominal property tax rates. Income through capital gains is tax free unless the
real estate is sold within two years of purchase.
A bizarre loophole in the German tax law that was closed in 1983 is worth
mentioning because it shows how owner-occupiers react to the special features
of the tax law. Until 1983, full mortgage interest could be deducted in addition
to the accelerated depreciation allowances plus all maintenance expenses in
houses with two dwelling units. This included also those two-unit houses that
had one unit owner-occupied and the other unit "rented" to a family member
without actual money ever flowing. Not too surprisingly, this "fake two-family
house" was very popular until the loophole was closed (in 1977 it constituted
17.3 percent of all buildings, about 40 percent of all one- and two-unit owner-
occupied houses).
Finally, savings for the down payment were subsidized by a special incentive
program when they were funneled into building societies.
2
5 Until recently, this
subsidy was both deep and widespread. About 50 percent of all households
had a building society savings account, and the subsidy reached 33 percent of
annual savings.
2
6 In 1990 this program was severely reduced. The maximum
subsidy rate is now 10 percent.
5.4.3 Homeownership Subsidies in Japan
Japan subsidizes housing primarily by low-interest loans. The rationing
rules favor people who buy a new house for themselves or build their own new
house. There are upper limits for these loans, and it is usually necessary to
complement them with commercial loans. Eligibility is also dependent on in-
come, house price, and floor space. For incomes below $53,000, the subsidy
amounts to an interest reduction of about 2 percent; for higher income house-
holds the reduction is about 1.5 percent. About 53 percent of all newly con-
structed houses received some form of public interest subsidy.
Neither mortgage interest nor depreciation is deductible from the Japanese
federal income tax. There is, however, a small, newly introduced tax credit for
25. See Borsch-Supan and Stahl (1991) for a detailed description and analysis.
26. For a median-income family with three children saving DM 936 annually.146 Axel Borsch-Supan
owner-occupancy, currently 1 percent of the remaining balance of the mort-
gage, up to about $1,000 annually for the first six years after purchasing a
house.
Imputed rental income of owner-occupancy is not taxed in Japan. In most
Japanese municipalities, the nominal property tax rate is 1.4 percent, and only
3.5 percent of the Japanese municipalities have property tax rates between 1.4
and 2.1 percent of assessed values. However, assessed values are low, and both
residential land and newly constructed buildings (up to three years old) are
subject to substantially reduced rates. On average, Japanese homeowners pay
twice as much in property taxes as Germans but less than half as much as
Americans. Capital gains are taxable when the house is sold. Moreover, the
substantial transaction taxes summarized in section 5.2.5 apply in this case.
5.4.4 Effects: Theory
The homeownership subsidies reduce the user cost of housing. Because the
magnitude of these subsidies depends on different facets of housing choices in
the three countries, they have different impacts on housing consumption. In
the United States, mortgage and property tax payments are reduced by the
homeownership subsidies in proportion to the marginal personal income tax
rate if deductions are itemized. The subsidy is then
HSVSA = (i> +Pe)-t-V,
where im denotes the mortgage interest rate, m the loan-to-value ratio, pe the
effective property tax rate, t the marginal personal income tax, and V the value
of the home.
Hence, the subsidy tilts housing decisions toward larger and more expensive
homes financed by higher loan-to-value ratios.
In Germany, homeownership subsidies
2
7 in the first years after construction
currently consist of the depreciation deduction, the (temporary) mortgage in-
terest deduction, and the child supplement:
HSGER = CS + t- (L
ma
x + d • s • V"™),
where d denotes the applicable accelerated depreciation rate and s the share of
construction costs in total value. The subsidies are independent of the house
value, unless the caps V"
3* on total value and L
ma
x on the loan are lower than
actual total value and actual loan. However, these caps are low, so this is rarely
the case. Because the subsidies depend on the structure-to-land ratio as the
only housing choice-related variable, housing decisions are less tilted to more
expensive projects and do not favor high loan-to-equity ratios as in the United
States. However, there is an incentive to substitute housing capital for land.
In Japan, user costs are reduced by the interest subsidy and the small tax
credit TC.
27.1 abstract from the effect of the savings subsidies.147 Housing Market Regulations and Performance: U.S., Germany, and Japan
Hence, the subsidy
HSiAP = TC+ r
depends on the interest gap between market and subsidized interest rate r and
the cap L
ma
x for subsidized loans. However, subsidies do not depend on the
marginal tax rates, as they do in Germany and in the United States. When we
compare the three countries, Japan has the least and the United States the most
distortive homeownership subsidies, with Germany in between.
The homeownership subsidies have been much more substantial in the
United States than in Germany. Table 5.16 compares the homeownership sub-
sidies in the United States and in Germany for typical income levels and house
values in the first few years of a new home. The subsidies changed consider-
ably from 1978 to 1992. In 1992, the subsidies in Germany remain smaller for
expensive houses but not for small houses. Moreover, the child supplement is
large, so for families with two or more children the homeownership subsidies
in Germany are now larger than in the United States. Japan has even higher
subsidies for median-income families. However, these subsidies decrease dra-
matically for larger incomes.
By decreasing the user costs of housing, the homeownership subsidies foster
new construction. Because the U.S. and German subsidies mainly affect
households with high marginal tax rates, this new construction takes place at
the top end of the quality scale. However, it is claimed that this mechanism
unfreezes housing at lower quality levels in a chain reaction and therefore pro-
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Note: Married couple, 20 percent equity-to-loan ratio in the United States and Japan, 40 percent
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vides more, thus also cheaper, housing for lower-income groups. In this sense,
subsidies for the rich help protect the poor. This "filtering" mechanism is de-
scribed in Sweeney (1974). Its working depends on the speed of this chain
reaction, thus on the possibility and costs of moving. Mobility is also the key
issue in terms of economic flexibility. Owner-occupied housing is said to tie
people to particular pieces of property, thus decreasing the willingness to move
when labor market changes may require relocation of labor.
5.4.5 Evidence
In order to gauge the evidence, we will ask three questions. First, do home-
ownership subsidies induce substitution from rental to owner-occupied hous-
ing? Second, do we observe filtering? Third, is mobility reduced when owner-
ship is high?
We have noted already in section 5.1 that the difference in ownership rates
between Germany and the United States corresponds to the historical differ-
ences in homeownership subsidies. Table 5.17 gives a more careful look at this
matter by conditioning on income. The exercise exemplifies the problems of
an international comparison. Columns 2 and 3 depict ownership rates by in-
come for the United States in 1987, while columns 4-9 present corresponding
rates for Germany. But what is corresponding? Columns 4 and 5 hold relative
social status constant and compute ownership rates for the corresponding in-
come percentiles. German ownership rates are much lower, reflecting what we
have seen in table 5.5. Columns 6 and 7 convert the income categories in col-
umn 1 by the ratio of the two countries' average income. Since income is dis-
tributed more equally in Germany, this results in much fewer households in
the top and bottom income categories. Measured this way, ownership rates are
still much lower in Germany than in the United States but not as drastically as
in columns 4 and 5. Finally, columns 8 and 9 use purchasing power parities for
conversion. Since German income levels are lower than U.S. ones, this shifts
many well-to-do Germans into relatively low U.S. income categories. Even
here, however, German ownership rates are lower than American ones.
These tables are suggestive but do not separate the effects of homeown-
ership subsidies from other cross-country differences. For a more causal link
between ownership rates and homeownership subsidies, I refer to the Borsch-
Supan (1985) study based on 1978 data. In that paper, I estimated discrete
choice housing demand equations for a sample of married couples in urban
areas, conditional on the differences in tax advantages and other explanatory
variables such as income and age.
2
8 In order to separate the effect of preference
differences from differences in the tax treatment, I simulated each country's
choice between renting and owning at the other country's tax laws and prefer-
ences. Table 5.18 summarizes the results.
28. The choices include renting versus owning, single-family versus multifamily house, and
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The table presents six simulations. The first three are run on the U.S. sample,
the second three on the German sample. Simulations 1 and 4 represent the
baseline ownership rates.
2
9 Simulations 2 and 5 isolate the effects of preference




Predicting either country with the other country's preferences does not
change the tenure choice very much. However, predicting each country's hous-
ing consumption at the other country's tax code effective at that time produces
drastic shifts into ownership in Germany and a substantial but much small
corresponding shift toward rental housing in the United States. The asymmetry
is due to tax law peculiarities and the discrepancy in land prices. Because Ger-
many has very high land prices (in addition to higher structure costs), Germans
could deduct a much higher proportion of their income under the 1978 U.S.
tax code than Americans actually did at that time. Hence, simulated ownership
rates jump from 42 percent to 80 percent. In turn, the German tax code was
unfavorable to high house values but provided tax advantages comparable to
the United States for typical U.S.-priced houses. Thus, the simulated change
is much smaller than the corresponding one based on German data.
As a third piece of evidence on the effectiveness of homeownership subsid-
ies, I look at changes over time. Since 1978 the tax laws have changed dramati-
cally (see table 5.16). These changes are also reflected in the homeownership
rates, as table 5.19 demonstrates. Ownership rates decreased in the United
States, while they increased in Germany. Moreover, the increase in Germany
is largest at middle-class and high incomes, that is, for those who have mar-
ginal tax rates above 25 percent (the top rate is 52 percent).
In summary, we have rather conclusive evidence that homeownership sub-
sidies do induce substitution toward ownership. What does this mean in terms
of social protection? The evidence for induced new construction is less over-
whelming because price elasticities of housing are rather low. More important,
there appears to be little direct evidence for the filtering process. Mills and
Hamilton (1984), for example, state that the process had an adverse effect for
29. Due to the estimation procedure, the predicted market shares at the baseline specification
are exactly the observed market shares.
30. Of course, because these simulations are drastic interferences with the steady states, they
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Sources: AHS 1974 and CPS 1987 as quoted from JCHS 1988; WS 1978 and SOEP 1987.
the United States because it created abandoned houses in the city centers. For
Germany, a large and carefully designed study by Weissbarth and Thomae
(1978) shows that the filtering process works well in supplying medium-
quality housing but that the moving chains are rather short. Thus, the filter
process is unlikely to reach those households who really need social pro-
tection.
The evidence on mobility is unambiguous (see table 5.7). Mobility rates are
dramatically lower for those households who live in owner-occupied housing.
Moves occur 4.4 times more frequently for renters in the U.S. and 2.6 times
more often in Germany. Thus, indirectly by encouraging homeownership, the
subsidies hinder economic flexibility by reducing mobility in general and inter-
regional mobility in particular.
A final issue is worth mentioning. It is claimed that the homeownership
subsidies help flatten the business cycle. Tax deductions that rest on marginal
tax rates do not accomplish this aim, because they are smaller in times of low
income. However, the German system of subsidized dedicated savings con-
tracts has this effect because it detaches mortgage interest rates in building
societies from the business cycle. This effect is indeed visible in figure 5.5.
This figure plots construction put in place as percentage deviation from a linear
trend. Except for the boom in the early 1970s, the German time series is
smoother than the U.S. one. As mentioned above, subsidies to the building
society system were severely reduced in the 1980s. It would be premature,
however, to ascribe the increasing amplitude of the building cycle in the 1980s
solely to this policy change.
5.5 Conclusions
This international comparison provides us with a rich but by no means sim-
ple collection of results. Housing markets in the United States, Germany, and152 Axel Borsch-Supan
1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990
Fig. 5.5 Newly constructed units in West Germany and the United States
(percentage deviation from linear trend)
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Construction Review; StBA (FS-5.1).
Japan respond to the incentives provided by the various government programs.
For some programs, the reactions are strong and unambiguous, such as the
response of homeownership rates to homeownership subsidies. In all three
countries, housing subsidies favor homeownership, but they do so much
more strongly in the United States and Japan. This also solves the puzzle of
why the United States and Japan have high and Germany a low ownership
share although the United States has low but Germany and Japan very high
land and housing prices.
However, the response to rent and eviction control is much less clear. It is
claimed that the Japanese tenants' protection legislation is the cause for drying
out the rental housing market in Japan. Unfortunately, we have no data to test
this claim. In Germany, rent profiles are in line with those predicted under rent
and eviction control. However, they are also similar in those areas of the United
States where no controls exist. In fact, there is no statistically detectable influ-
ence of rent and eviction control on the evolution of rental prices for sitting
tenants.
What does all of this mean in terms of social protection and economic flex-
ibility? There is no evidence at all that homeownership subsidies help the poor
by filtering abundant housing on higher quality levels down to the poor. In
turn, the evidence clearly links high homeownership rates with low mobility,
and the causes are obvious as homeownership ties people to their property.
Insofar as mobility helps economic flexibility, homeownership subsidies are
thus hindering economic flexibility. The German housing financing system—
in which the government used to subsidize savings in building societies that
are detached from the capital market—had the positive effect of smoothing
the business cycle; thus, it reduced construction industry unemployment in
recession periods and cooled down labor market stress in boom periods.153 Housing Market Regulations and Performance: U.S., Germany, and Japan
Rent and eviction control of the German design (i.e., with unregulated initial
rents) appears to be a successful insurance mechanism protecting tenants from
being exploited. The evidence on economic flexibility—again, measured in
terms of the willingness to move—is less than perfect. Clearly, Germany and
Japan, with their omnipresent controls, have lower mobility than the United
States. However, time series do not react to changes in the stringency of the
laws, and mobility is lower in Germany than in Japan although the controls are
tighter in Japan.
This chapter could not analyze all housing-related issues affecting economic
flexibility and social protection without crowding out the space this volume
can provide. Important topics not dealt with here are land use regulations, zon-
ing, and building codes. The jury is still out in a fascinating case.
Appendix A
Data Sources
The following data sources have been used in constructing the tables:
Germany
SUB: Statistical Yearbook of the Federal Republic of Germany
StBA (FS-5.1): Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 5.1
VZ: Volkszahlung (Census of Population)
GWZ: Gebaude- und Wohnungszahlung (Census of Housing)
SOEP: Sozio-Okonomisches Panel (Socioeconomic Panel)
Japan
JHC: Japanese Housing Census (Housing Survey of Japan)
JMC: Japanese Ministry of Construction, Construction Dynamics Series
JKDS: Juutaku Keizai Data Shu (Collection of Economic Housing Data)
United States
StAb: Statistical abstract of the United States
EcRep: Economic report of the president, statistical tables
AHS: American housing survey
CPS: Current population survey
USCCR: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Construction reports
JCHS: Joint Center of Housing Studies, The state of the nation's housing
PSID: Panel studies of income dynamics
Data Availability
Except for the microdata sets (SOEP, PSID) and the JCHS reports, all data
are available in printed volumes edited by the German, Japanese, and U.S.154 Axel Borsch-Supan
government printing offices, respectively. The JCHS Reports on the state of
the nation's housing are available from the Joint Center for Housing Studies of
Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138. The German Socioeco-
nomic Panel (SOEP) is available in public use form with English documenta-
tion from the International Aging Project at the Maxwell School, Syracuse
University, Syracuse, New York 13244.
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